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Britain’s EU Renegotiation: Reflections on the Letter 
 








The Prime Minister’s letter laying out terms for renegotiation of the UK’s 
membership of the EU is more noteworthy for its arrival than its content, writes 
Anthony Salamone. He argues that, while the UK and its negotiating partners are 
likely to draw on past experience in finding a means of reaching a deal, the reality 
of one Member State proactively seeking a different relationship with the EU 
presents its challenges for all involved. 
 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s long awaited letter setting out the terms for EU 
renegotiation has finally arrived. Accompanied by an explanatory speech, the letter 
outlines four areas for reform (economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty 
and immigration). While these choices attract little surprise, it is a milestone 
nonetheless to have in writing the opening outlines of the UK government’s position 
on renegotiation. 
 
In studying the letter, the first observation is, in the customary handwritten 
salutation, the prominence of the addressee. ‘Dear Donald’ has been featured 
throughout the UK media. It is unlikely that the President of the European Council 
has ever been mentioned in such a consistent, concentrated and high-profile 
manner in the British press since the role was created. 
 
It is only natural that the Prime Minister should address his letter to President Tusk. 
As Cameron makes clear in the text, Tusk invited him to send it in the first place. 
Moreover, he seeks renegotiation with the political leaders of the Member States 
and their venue is the European Council. It is simply interesting to observe the 
growing notoriety of the EUCO President – without this implying a commensurate 
increase in power – several years on from its start. 
 
Across the themes in the letter, the Prime Minister underscores his insistence on 
effecting change in the EU through measures which are legally binding. The most 
obvious way to achieve top-level legally binding agreement is through amending 
the EU treaties. However, the practicalities involved would make it near impossible 
to complete treaty change before the EU referendum. More to the point, some 
Member States, such as France, have no appetite for treaty reform at present. 
 
The Prime Minister makes reference to Ireland and Denmark as cases where the EU 
has been able to accommodate the concerns of an individual Member State in the 
past. While true in general, the circumstances are quite different now. Both 
Denmark (with the Maastricht Treaty) and Ireland (with the Lisbon Treaty) found 
themselves in difficulty trying to ratify treaties. The measures agreed with the EU 
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were specifically designed to address public concerns following the rejection of the 
respective treaties in referendums. 
 
Nevertheless, the means of achieving Britain’s EU demands are likely to be similar – 
namely, a protocol. Following successful negotiations, the Member States would 
sign an agreement to provide for the terms reached. At this point, the agreement 
would not be binding in the sense that it would not (yet) be part of the EU treaties. 
In the future, with more time and presumably greater political flexibility, the 
contents of the agreement would be attached as a protocol to the treaties. This 
process would require ratification by all EU Member States. 
 
In Ireland’s case, a deal was reached in 2009 and the Lisbon Treaty was ratified and 
it subsequently entered into force. The protocol officially attaching the agreement 
to the treaties was achieved in 2013. Although the wait was several years, the 
bargain was upheld. In practice, the political agreement was maintained from the 
start, long before it became primary EU law. 
 
Could a similar approach work for Britain? In terms of headline political agreements, 
alternative options are limited. It fits with EU precedence (in part), so Member 
States might be predisposed. The approach would not result in immediate treaty 
change, national ratifications, referendums or involvement of the EU institutions (in 
particular the European Parliament) – all of which would also appeal. 
 
Whether any of this deal-making would either be acceptable or convincing to the 
British public is another question. Judging from the letter, the reforms are likely to 
be modest and unimpressive to the average voter. More to the point, the debate on 
the UK’s EU membership will almost certainly revolve around big issues and salient 
matters of domestic politics – not, for instance, whether the House of Commons 
can invite other national parliamentary chambers to work together to block an EU 
legislative proposal. 
 
Everything else aside, it is worth keeping in mind that this process is entirely driven 
by the UK. We are not in situation of an EU law were Britain objects or an EU treaty 
where Britain wants a special arrangement. This is Britain proactively, if not 
unilaterally, seeking to change how the EU works – for its own benefit, cloaked 
(faintly) in the general EU interest. Despite the pleasant tone of the letter, it seems 
somehow improbable that leaders in the rest of Europe will be convinced overnight 
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